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In the European Union, databases are protected by a specific intellectual 
property right, the database sui generis right, also known as the ‘database 
right’. Many have criticised it for its excessive breadth. Section 1 of the 
chapter first briefly presents the database right’s main features. Thereafter, 
Section 2 examines whether the public’s right to information, which is 
protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), must be taken into account into the database right legislation (the 
Database Directive). It concludes that it must and therefore determines how it 
must be taken into account. To do so, a standard will be used. Section 3 then 
scrutinises the database right to see whether the public’s right to information 
is sufficiently taken into account. As some features of the right are too broad 
and do not respect the public’s right to information, Section 4 suggests 
remedies using the standard established in Section 2. 
 
 
1. MAIN FEATURES OF THE DATABASE RIGHT  
 
The database right was introduced in 1996 by Directive 96/9/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the legal protection of databases 
(‘the Directive’).1 Even if the Directive is not explicit on the database right’s 
legal nature, it is an intellectual property right. It is implicit from Article 7(3) 
which states that the right may be transferred, assigned or granted under 
contractual licence and from Article 7(1), which states it is a right to prevent 
extraction and reutilisation of the contents of the database. In addition, the 
principle of exhaustion (Article 7(2)(b)) and exceptions to the rights (Articles 
                                                 
1  Directive of 11 March 1996, OJ L77/20, 27 March 1996.  
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8 and 9) are provided and the right has a term of protection (Article 10), like 
other intellectual property rights.2 
The right protects databases. They can be in any form, for example, on 
paper, CD-ROM or online (Article 1(1)) and are defined as collections ‘of 
independent works, data or other materials, systematically or methodically 
arranged and individually accessible by electronic or other means’ (Article 
1(2)). This definition is quite broad and it has been argued that supermarkets, 
rooms, stone collections, even carnival processions, could be databases.3 
This is because of the term ‘materials’, which can arguably include tangible 
objects. Nevertheless, apart from this breadth due to the term ‘materials’, the 
definition is somewhat circumscribed, as the items must be independent from 
each other. This will, for example, exclude statistical tables whose numbers 
are dependent on one another, that is, no element has autonomous 
informative value. In addition, the elements must be arranged systematically 
or methodically. This will exclude haphazard collections.4  
                                                 
2  An overwhelming majority of commentators also classified it as an intellectual property 
right. See, for example, W. Copinger and F. Skone James, On Copyright (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999, 14th edn), 18–04; V. Bensinger, Sui generis Schutz für Databanken, die 
EG-Datenbank Richtlinie vor dem Hintergrund des nordischen Rechts (Munich: Beck, 
1999), 111 ff; J. Gaster, Der Rechtschutz von Databanken (Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 
1999), 118 ff, 457 ff; H. Laddie, P. Prescott and M. Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright 
and Designs (Butterworths: London, 2000, 3rd edn), 14, 1–26 and 1072, 30.36; G. 
Westkamp, Der Schutz von Datenbanken und Informationssammlungen in britischen und 
deutschen Recht (Munich: Beck, 2003), 116; G. Karnell, ‘The European Sui Generis 
Protection of Data Bases: Nordic and U.K. Law Approaching the Court of the European 
Communities – Some Comparative Reflections’, Journal of the Copyright Society of the 
USA (2002), at 998; J. Angel and T. Quinn, ‘The New Database Law’, Computer Law and 
Security Report (1998) 34; P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘De databankrichtlijn eindelijk aanvaard: een 
zeer kritisch commentaar’, Computerrecht (1996), at 134; G. Koumantos, ‘Les bases de 
données dans la directive communautaire’, Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 171/79 
(1997), 114–15; J. Lipton, ‘Security Interests in Electronic Databases’, International 
Journal of Law & Information Technology 9 (2001), 65, 72; N. Mallet-Poujol, ‘La directive 
concernant la protection juridique des bases de données: la gageure de la protection 
privative’, Droit de l'Informatique & des Télécoms 1 (1996), 6; F. Pollaud-Dulian, 
‘Comment on Tigest v. Reed Exposition France et Salons Français et Internationaux’, CA 
Paris, 12 September 2001 JCP, 1, 2 January 2002 (2002), 28; M. Studer, ‘The Quest for 
Legal Protection of Databases in the Digital Age, Recent Developments with Focus on the 
United States’, Journal of World Intellectual Property (2001), at 662; N. Thakur, ‘Database 
Protection in the European Union and the United States: the European Database Directive 
as an Optimum Global Model?’ Intellectual Property Quarterly (2001), at 114. 
3  M. Davison, Sui Generis Protection of Databases, Ph.D. thesis, University of Monash, 
2001 (on file with the author), 83–4; A. Quaedvlieg, ‘Onafhankelijk, geordend en 
toegangkelijk: het object van het databankenrecht in de richtlijn’, Informatierecht/AMI 9 
(2000), 177; D. Visser, ‘Carnaval in Oss: Variété, Databank of Folkore?’ Mediaforum 
(1999), 374. 
4  This interpretation has been confirmed by the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) in its four 
related decisions of 9 November 2004, Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Organismos Prognostikon 
Agonon Podosfairou (OPAP) (case C–444/02) [2005] 1 CMLR 16 (further referred to as 
‘OPAP’); Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB (case C–46/02) [2005] ECDR 2 
(further referred to as ‘Veikkaus’); Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB (case C–
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The right accrues when a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial 
investment in the obtaining, verifying or presenting of the materials is proven 
(Article 7). What is an investment is not defined. However, from the 
Directive’s recitals and the ECJ’s (European Court of Justice) interpretation 
in its decisions of 2004, it is clear that investment can be financial, material 
(acquisition of equipment, for example, computers) or human (number of 
employees, hours of work). The Directive does not define a substantial 
investment and the ECJ did not venture in giving an interpretation. Many 
national courts, and the Advocate General in its Opinion in the Veikkaus 
case,5 have interpreted the requirement as being rather low. For example, a 
few days work or a few hundred pounds or euros may be sufficient to qualify 
the database.6 By contrast, the terms ‘qualitatively’ and ‘quantitatively’ have 
been interpreted by the ECJ. A quantitatively substantial investment refers to 
the amount of money and/or time invested in the database, while a 
qualitatively substantial investment refers to the effort and/or energy invested 
in the database. The alternative requirement set out in the Directive 
(quantitatively or qualitatively) therefore allows protecting a database that 
required only a substantial investment in effort or energy rather than in 
money.  
The ECJ construed the term ‘obtaining’ as meaning only collecting the 
elements of a database. This excludes their creation.7 This interpretation is 
very important because a lot of so called spin-off databases, similar to those 
in question in the cases before the ECJ (that is, horseracing and football 
fixtures) are now excluded from protection. This includes, for example, event 
schedules, television or radio programmes, transport timetables, telephone 
subscriber data, stock prices, scientific data resulting from research or 
experimentation and sports results. If the substantial investment in the 
collection, verification or presentation of the materials is inseparable from 
the substantial investment in their creation, the right will not subsist. On the 
other hand, verifying and presenting have been given a straightforward 
dictionary meaning. Verifying means ensuring the reliability of the 
information contained in the database and monitoring the accuracy of the 
materials collected when the database was created and during its operation.8 
                                                                                                         
338/02) [2005] ECDR 4 (further referred to as ‘Svenska Spel’) and The British Horseracing 
Board Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd (case C–203/02) [2005] 1 CMLR 15 (further 
referred to as  ‘BHB’), also available on www.curia.eu.int. 
5  Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, 8 June 2004, case C–46/02 (Veikkaus), para. 49, 
available on www.curia.eu.int. 
6  See, for example, Sonacotra v Syndicat Sud Sonacotra, TGI Paris, 25 April 2003 [2003] 
Dalloz, 2819, comment C. Le Stanc, available on www.legalis.net; Spot v Canal Numédia, 
TPI Bruxelles (réf.), 18 January 2001 [2002] Revue Ubiquité 95, comment S. Dusollier. 
7  See, for example, paragraph 24 (Svenska Spel). 
8  Paragraph 27 (Svenska Spel). 
 
6 Copyright, Corporate Power and Human Rights 
 
Presenting refers to ‘the resources used for the purpose of giving the 
database its function of processing information, that is to say those used for 
the systematic or methodical arrangement of the materials contained in that 
database and the organisation of their individual accessibility’.9 
As briefly mentioned above, the database right grants to the database 
maker, the right to prevent the extraction and the reutilisation of a substantial 
part, evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively, of the contents of the protected 
database (Article 7). The rights of extraction and reutilisation can be 
compared to the rights of reproduction and communication to the public in 
copyright law, as they are very similar. A substantial part has not been 
defined but, according to the ECJ, it must represent a substantial investment. 
Thanks to the ECJ’s ruling, it is also clear that a part that does not fulfil the 
requirement of a substantial part is automatically an insubstantial part.10 
Finally, the substantial part evaluated quantitatively refers to the volume of 
the data extracted or re-utilised from the database and it must be assessed in 
relation to the volume of the contents of the whole of the database,11 while 
the substantial part evaluated qualitatively refers to the scale of investment in 
the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents, regardless of 
whether that subject (or part) represents a quantitatively substantial part of 
the contents.12 Users can therefore use insubstantial parts as long as they do 
not do it repeatedly and systematically so that the accumulation of 
insubstantial parts becomes a substantial part.13 
There are three exceptions to the rights but they are all optional so 
Member States did not have to implement them. According to Article 9 of 
the Directive, lawful users, that is, those who have acquired a lawful copy of 
the database,14 can (a) extract a substantial part of the contents of a non-
electronic database for private purposes; (b) extract a substantial part of any 
database for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as 
long as it is not for commercial purposes and the source is indicated; and (c) 
extract and/or reutilise a substantial part of any database for the purposes of 
                                                 
9  Paragraph 27 (Svenska Spel). 
10  Paragraph 73 (BHB). 
11  Paragraph 70 (BHB).  
12  Paragraph 71 (BHB). 
13   Articles 7(5) and 8(1) as construed by the ECJ, see paragraph 86 (BHB). 
14  No clear guidance is given in the Directive as to who is a lawful user. This is our preferred 
interpretation as well as the one given by V. Vanovermeire, ‘The Concept of the Lawful 
User in the Database directive’, International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright 
Law (2000), 62, at 71; U. Suthersanen, ‘A Comparative Review of Database Protection in 
the European Union and the United States’, in F. Dessemontet and R. Gani, eds, Creative 
Ideas for Intellectual Property, The ATRIP Papers 2000–2001 (Lausanne: Cédidac, 2002), 
at 74; M. Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 78; H. Vanhees, ‘De juridische bescherming van databanken’, Rijkskundig 
Weekblad (1999–2000) at 1007. 
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public security or an administrative or judicial procedure. Thus the number 
of exceptions varies from Member State to Member State. In France, for 
example, there is no teaching and research exception; while in the United 
Kingdom there is no private extraction exception. And vice versa. In both 
those countries, however, Article 9(c) was implemented.15 Some countries 
implemented all three exceptions (for example, Belgium).16 The right of the 
user to use insubstantial parts not amounting to a substantial part has been 
made imperative but not the three optional exceptions. Therefore, database 
makers can override them by contract and by technological protection 
measures (TPMs) as long, however, as Article 6(4) of the Copyright 
Directive17 is respected.18 
Finally, databases are protected for 15 years from their completion or their 
publication (Article 10). Furthermore, each time the database maker reinvests 
substantially in the obtaining, verifying or presenting of the elements of her 
database and there is a substantial change, she gets a new term of 15 years. 
What is unclear however is whether she gets it on the whole new database 
which comprises the ‘old’ elements (that is, those whose term has expired) or 
only on the elements that have newly been included, verified or presented. 
 
 
2.  SHOULD THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE DATABASE 
RIGHT AND IF SO HOW? 
 
To ascertain whether the public’s right to information should be taken into 
account by the database right, it must be recalled that, as it is an intellectual 
property right, the intellectual property paradigm applies. The intellectual 
property paradigm can be summarised as follows. No intellectual property 
right is absolute. There is an initial balance made within intellectual property 
laws. This balance represents a trade-off between several interests, mainly 
those of the creators on the one hand and those of the public or the users on 
the other. All intellectual property rights have therefore a delimited subject-
matter, protection requirements, rights, exceptions and a limited term. How 
the balance is made in practice is different for each right. Sometimes this 
balance can tilt too much in favour of the authors, producers or inventors to 
                                                 
15  See Article L. 331–4 of the French Intellectual Property Code, Law no. 92–597 of 1 July 
1992 as amended by Law no. 98–536 of 1 July 1998 and regulation 20(2) of the Copyright 
and Rights in Databases Regulations of 18 December 1997, S.I. 1997 n. 3032. 
16  Article 23 bis of the 1994 Copyright Act. 
17  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L167/10, 22 June 2001. 
18  This will be explored in more detail later. 
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the detriment of society.19 Remedies must then be found either internally (for 
example, by way of introducing new exceptions or expanding the existing 
ones) or when it is not possible, as has been proposed by some,20 externally 
(for example, using human rights).  
Since, apart from the Directive itself, there is no guidance as to whether 
the public’s right to information is a relevant area of law that must be 
considered when enacting or interpreting the database right, the latter must 
be compared to the most closely related intellectual property right, that is, 
copyright. This is because originally databases were protected by copyright 
as literary works in many countries; although in some only the structure was 
protected (for example, France, Belgium, Germany), while in others (United 
Kingdom, Ireland) it was the contents. The traditional justifications for 
copyright (naturalist and utilitarian), as well as the much more recent 
justification that copyright is a human right,21 do not determine the exact 
limits of copyright (for example, how long the term should be, what the 
protection requirements should be) and, in this regard, they are not helpful.22 
They only state that there must be a balance but do not determine which one 
or how to make it. The only justification that does that to a certain extent is 
the economic analysis of copyright law.23 Under the economic justification 
of copyright, ideas should not be protected, as they create monopolies that in 
turn generate welfare loss. This means that the number of works is reduced 
and this is not in the general interest as it reduces social welfare. Therefore, 
only expressions should be protected. However if the law makes it 
impossible to borrow some of the protected expression of a work, the 
number of works will decrease and, again, this will not enhance general 
welfare. Thus some use of works should be allowed, such as book reviews 
and productive use. Productive use (as opposed to reproductive use) lowers 
the costs of expression24 and thus reduces the cost of creating new works, 
                                                 
19  C. Geiger, Droit d’auteur et droit du public à l’information, Approche de droit comparé, 
(Paris: Litec, 2004), 69–112, showed that in copyright law, the balance has now tilted too 
much in favour of the producers. 
20  Geiger, ibid., uses human rights to balance copyright law. 
21  See, for example, Geiger, supra n. 19; P. Torremans, ‘Copyright as Human Right’, in P. 
Torremans, ed., Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression – Intellectual 
Property – Privacy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 1; A. Strowel and F. 
Tulkens, ‘Freedom of Expression and Copyright under Civil Law: Of Balance, Adaptation, 
and Access’, in J. Griffiths and U. Suthersanen, eds, Copyright and Free Speech, 
Comparative and International Analyses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 292–
4.  
22  This is explored in detail in the author’s doctoral thesis on the legal protection of databases 
(to be published), at 33–43. 
23  See mainly, W. Landes and R. Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’, Journal 
of Legal Studies 18 (1989), 325. 
24  The costs of expression are opposed to the costs of production. The former include the cost 
of creating the work (the author’s time and effort) added to, in the case of literary works, 
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thereby increasing the total number of works. Reproductive use reduces the 
demand for the protected work. If a parody, for instance, reduces the demand 
for the original work, then it should be deemed to be infringing and not fair 
use.25 Finally, a limited copyright term reduces both monopoly profits and 
tracing costs. The longer the term, the fewer the number of works in the 
public domain and the higher the costs of expression will be and, therefore, 
the fewer works produced.26 Again, social welfare is not enhanced.  
However, the economic justification of copyright does not perfectly 
determine the exact limits of copyright as it does not allow certain 
reproductive uses that are necessary to respect freedom of expression and the 
public’s right to information (which, as a reminder, must be respected by 
signatories that are legally bound by the ECHR). This is why, even if the 
newer justification for copyright, the human rights justification, does not 
determine the exact limits of copyright, it nevertheless readjusts the 
economic justification as it puts copyright on the same level as other human 
rights. Indeed, in the ECHR, all human rights have the same rank.27 
Combining human rights’ and economic justifications ensures that certain 
uses are allowed that, under the economic justification alone, are not (for 
example, some reproductive uses). It is therefore stressed that both 
justifications complement each other and neither one is better than the other. 
Each has its own merits. 
Therefore it is submitted that an appropriate criterion to determine the 
right balance within the database right is the economic analysis of law 
combined with the human rights’ justification.28 Indeed, all intellectual 
property rights are human rights. Although they are not expressly catalogued 
in the ECHR, they are within the ambit of Article 1 of the First Additional 
Protocol of the Convention, which recognises the property right as a human 
right. Case law and commentators are unanimous in saying that this article 
does not only apply to tangible goods but also to intangible ones.29 The 
database right, like copyright, is therefore a human right (property right) and 
a ‘right of others’, mentioned in Article 10(2) of the ECHR, which can 
restrict the freedom of expression and public’s right to information. This also 
                                                                                                         
the publisher’s cost of soliciting and editing the manuscript and setting it in type. The costs 
of production are the costs of printing, binding and distributing individual copies. Ibid., at 
327. 
25  Ibid., at 360. 
26  Ibid., at 362. 
27  Geiger, supra n. 19, at 167; C. Caron, ‘Liberté d’expression et liberté de la presse contre 
droit de propriété intellectuelle’, Communication Commerce Electronique 2 (2002), 25; 
Torremans, supra n. 21, at 17. 
28  For a more detailed explanation, see the author’s thesis, 54 ff. The reason is that both 
copyright works and databases protected by the database right are information goods and 
the economics of information goods apply similarly to both.  
29  Geiger, supra n. 19, at 169. 
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means two things. First, like copyright, since the database right is a human 
right, it has the same rank as the public’s right to information and the right to 
freedom of expression. One is not by nature stronger than the other. An equal 
balance should be found between the two. Second, consequently, this also 
means that the two must be balanced against each other using the 
proportionality test expressed in Article 10(2) of the ECHR: freedom of 
information can be restricted as long as it is provided by law; the law pursues 
a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights 
of others. ‘Law’ means that it must be sufficiently accessible and stated with 
sufficient precision so that citizens can regulate their behaviour accordingly. 
‘Legitimate motives’ covers the protection of rights of others, including 
intellectual property rights.30 The last condition creates a proportionality test. 
However this test does not clarify the extent of the restriction because the 
balance will always be appreciated in concreto, in light of the facts of the 
case.31 The solution may thus be different in each case. Thus, when there is a 
conflict between copyright and freedom of expression there will be a balance 
of interests, and the room for manoeuvre left to lawmakers and judges will 
be lesser or greater depending on the case. Besides, while the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has never ruled on the intersection between 
copyright and freedom of speech or the public’s right to information,32 nor 
on the intersection between the latter and the database right, the European 
Commission of Human Rights (ECommHR) held in France 2 v France33 that 
it is normally not for the organs of the Convention to arbitrate, under Article 
10(2), the conflicts that can occur between the right to communicate 
information freely and copyright.34 Thus, unless the Court departs in the 
future from the Commission’s view, it seems that a concrete test will never 
be established by the highest judicial organs. 
Even if there is no judicial test, commentators have proposed tests to 
arbitrate conflicts between copyright and free speech. Professor Macmillan 
suggested that in order to find a balance between copyright and free speech, 
the nature of the copyright material and the purpose for which it is taken 
                                                 
30  Geiger, supra n. 19, ibid., at 167–8. 
31  Geiger, supra n. 19, ibid., citing The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No.1) (A/30), 
[1979–80] 2 EHRR 245, paragraph 59; Barthold v Germany [1985] 7 EHRR 383, 
paragraph 42. Strowel and Tulkens, supra n. 21, at 292.  
32  Strowel and Tulkens, supra n. 21, 295. 
33  Case 30262/96, 15 January 1997, 7 Informatierecht/AMI (1999) 115.  
34  However, in that case the Commission ruled that the granting of damages for filming 
copyright works integrally without permission was a necessary restriction in a democratic 
society to protect others’ rights. However, it did not use a specific test to come to that result 
but decided in view of the circumstances of the cases (on a case-by-case basis).  
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must be taken into account.35 Professor Torremans, on the other hand, stated 
that ‘the higher the level of creativity and the more important the input of the 
creator is, the stronger the Human Rights claim of copyright will be’.36 
Easton proposed the criterion of the public importance of the work protected. 
When a work is of public importance, a compulsory licence may not even be 
enough because a price still needs to be paid.37 Easton thus advocates free 
use of the work. So far no guidance has been given in respect of the sui 
generis right.38 
What does it mean then that the two justifications (economic and human 
rights) must be combined? It means that while some protection must be 
granted to databases in the form of an intellectual property right, the right 
must be curtailed so that it respects the economic analysis of law and the 
public’s right to information. This entails several consequences.  
First, only databases created at a cost should be protected; databases that 
required no investment should remain unprotected (for example, databases 
made by the state). Information and ideas must not be monopolised because 
this reduces social welfare. But here, there is a tension between market 
failure and welfare loss. It may, in some cases, be important to grant a right 
on a database for a short period and with tight conditions in order to induce 
production of this information. In this respect, a distinction between sole 
source and multiple source databases must be drawn. If the data is only 
available through one database (sole source), legal protection can be granted 
if there has been investment in making the database but this monopoly must 
be tightly regulated. Access to the information must not be prevented by 
refusal to grant access or by abusive prices.39 If the database is made of data 
existing in the public domain (multiple source), no monopoly is by definition 
possible as anybody can create the same database independently. In this case 
granting protection does not create a monopoly on information. If there are 
several sources of the same information, there is competition and the price 
                                                 
35  F. Macmillan Patfield, ‘Towards a Reconciliation of Free Speech and Copyright’, in E. 
Barendt, S. Bate, J. Dickens and T. Gibbons, eds, Yearbook of Media and Entertainment 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), at 226–7. 
36  Torremans supra n. 21, 19. 
37  E. Easton, ‘Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know’, 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 21 (2003), 188. 
38  J. Phillips, ‘Databases, the Human Rights Act and EU law’, in J. Griffiths and U. 
Suthersanen, eds, Copyright and Free Speech, Comparative and International Analyses 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 402 (offers some initial thoughts but not a 
concrete test stating that ‘general surveys of the human rights–intellectual property 
interface do not include database right’). 
39  The proposals of Professors Macmillan and Torremans, supra n. 35 and 21 (consideration 
of the nature of copyright material; the higher the creative input, the stronger the human 
rights claim of copyright should be) can also apply to databases. Databases only protected 
by the sui generis right reflect no creative input, so the human rights claim of the database 
maker is weak. 
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will be reasonable. If one database maker refuses access the user can get 
access to another source.  
Second, productive use of the data comprised in the database should be 
allowed while reproductive use should be forbidden, except those that protect 
freedom of speech and dissemination of information. 
Third, database protection must be limited in time to avoid the negative 
effects of monopolies in static situations. In addition, after a period of time 
the investment is normally recouped and there is no reason to continue 
protecting the result of the investment (the database contents).  
Other consequences as to the limits of the right are extrapolated from 
Geiger’s analysis of the copyright/public’s right to information interface.40 
The limits and exceptions of the database right that are justified by human 
rights are rights and not simply interests. Therefore, since they are rights, 
they are at the same level as the database owner’s extraction and reutilisation 
rights. Consequently, they should not be interpreted restrictively nor should 
they be overridable by contracts or TPMs. However, this must be nuanced in 
respect of the database right. The distinction between multiple and sole 
source databases is important here. It is only necessary to render the 
exceptions and limits imperative against contracts and TPMs when the 
protected databases are sole source. Indeed, when there are several similar 
databases there will be competition and it is unlikely that such means will be 
used to restrict access to databases. 
At the close of this analysis, the answer to the question that this section 
posed is now obvious: the public’s right to information should definitely be 
taken into account when analysing the database right. It is as important as the 
most precise justification to determine the scope of the database right, the 
economic analysis of information goods, and it is its necessary complement. 
The above developments constitute our test or standard when verifying 
whether the provisions of the Directive concerning the database right took 
the public’s right to information sufficiently into account.  
 
 
3.  IS THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
SUFFICIENTLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE 
DATABASE RIGHT? 
 
After this overview and the positive answer to the question that the database 
right should take the public’s right to information into consideration, the 
database right can be scrutinised against the standard established above to 
determine whether it is balanced or not; in other words, whether the public’s 
                                                 
40  Geiger, supra n. 19, at 186–93, 198 ff.  
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right to information is sufficiently taken into account.   
Normally, as with copyright, the lawmaker strikes the right balance from 
the outset by providing appropriate limits in the law. But sometimes these 
limits and/or their judicial interpretation do not take the public’s right to 
information sufficiently into account. Therefore the public’s right to 
information may be used to correct that imbalance.41  
First, nowhere does the Directive account for the intersection between the 
sui generis right and the public’s right to information.42 As the recitals show, 
the policy behind the adoption of the Directive was purely economic.43 Once 
the limits of the database right are explored, this absence of balance in some 
important aspects of the right is revealed. The two main imbalances are the 
scarcity and narrowness of the exceptions to the right and the possible 
perpetual term.44 This does not mean, as many a commentator has claimed, 
however, that the right creates a monopoly on information.45 In fact, in 
almost all cases it will not, and will remain a right on investment. As 
explained above, a monopoly will only arise when the maker of a sole source 
database obtains the right and this is only possible if she can prove that a 
substantial investment has been made in obtaining, verifying or presenting 
the contents of the database, which must be separate from their creation. This 
will be rare. In case it happens, however, remedies must be found to curb 
monopoly effects; these will be discussed in the next section.  
Let us come back to the two main problems: exceptions and term. First, 
the exceptions to the rights are both too narrow and too scarce. Also, they are 
only optional so some Member States may just ignore them. Reproductive 
uses, which protect freedom of speech and dissemination of information, are 
not adequately taken into account: there are no exceptions for the purposes of 
criticism and review or citation, nor for the purposes of news reporting. The 
latter two exceptions, which exist in most copyright laws, are necessary to 
ensure that the public’s right to information is respected. Also, the database 
right does not provide compulsory or statutory licences in the case of sole 
source databases for uses not falling in the exceptions above (mainly 
commercial uses). 
Second, the right is not limited in time. Article 10(3) concerning the 
                                                 
41  Competition law is another means to correct such imbalance but this means is outside the 
scope of this chapter. 
42  Phillips, supra n. 38, at 411. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Some problems also occur with some elements of the definition of a database but will not 
be explored here. The reader is referred to the author’s thesis at 169–70. 
45  Mallet-Poujol, supra n. 2, 10; J. Reichman and P. Samuelson, ‘Intellectual Property Rights 
in Data?’ Vanderbilt Law Review 50 (1997), at 94; Geiger, supra n. 19, at 269, 268, n. 312 
and 273, n. 316, citing S. Dusollier, Y. Poullet and M. Buydens, ‘Copyright and Access to 
Information in the Digital Environment’, Copyright Bulletin 34 (2000), 8.  
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renewal of the term is unclear. Because of this lack of clarity, the database 
right may not take into account the economics of information goods nor the 
public’s right to information. This is because old elements of a database, for 
which the investment has been recouped, could be protected indefinitely as 
long as they are kept in the new database to which the new term applies. The 
ECJ may have implicitly removed this potentiality when interpreting the test 
of infringement. As there must be a link between the part taken and the 
investment, if a user takes old elements of a database by definition she does 
not infringe. Nonetheless a problem still remains: the Directive does not 
provide a mechanism for the user to distinguish between old and new 
elements and, thus, does not ensure she knows whether she does or does not 
infringe. Because of the lack of such mechanism, the database right does not 
respect the public’s right to information.   
The answer to the question posed in this section is therefore that the 
public’s right to information is not sufficiently taken into consideration 





To remedy these problems, the following solutions can be used. They apply 
the standard developed in Section 2 (combination of the economic analysis 
of copyright and the human rights approach) and are mainly internal, that is, 
a revision of the Directive is necessary. However, in cases before them, 
courts can use Article 10 of the ECHR to achieve the same results since the 
internal solutions are based on it.  
 
4.1    Solutions to Remedy the Scarcity and Narrowness of Exceptions 
 
First, the optional exceptions provided in the Directive should be mandatory, 
that is, all Member States should be obliged to implement them.  
Second, Article 9(b) should apply not only to extraction for teaching and 
research but also to re-utilisation because communicating information 
contained in a database is necessary, if not indispensable, to teaching and 
research. In addition, the exception should not only apply to illustration for 
teaching and research. The word ‘illustration’ should therefore be deleted to 
allow the broadest application. With these changes, this exception takes into 
account the public’s right to information.46 A fair compensation could be 
imposed. This is a policy choice. Requiring compensation would still respect 
                                                 
46  Geiger, supra n. 19, 366–8, n. 428. This exception could be granted to unlawful users as 
long as producers get compensated by way of a compulsory or statutory licence.   
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the standard determined in Section 2 but would weigh more in favour of 
database producers.  
Third, at least two additional exceptions should be enacted, one allowing 
extraction and re-utilisation of a substantial part of the contents of a database 
for the purposes of news reporting, the other for the purposes of criticism or 
review. Only with these two additional exceptions, would the right 
effectively guarantee the public’s right to information.47 Fourth, an exception 
similar to Article 5(3)(b) of the Copyright Directive, which allows uses for 
the benefit of people with a disability, could also be added. Alternatively, 
instead of enacting specific exceptions, a broad fair use exception similar to 
the American copyright fair use provision (section 107 of the Copyright Act) 
could be enacted.  
In addition to those exceptions, which should be applicable to all 
databases, compulsory or statutory licences should be provided in the case of 
sole source databases for uses not falling in the exceptions above (mainly 
commercial uses).48 Such internal solution is better than leaving the solution 
of this problem to competition authorities because it is more certain legally 
as it is determined ex ante.49 Since sole source databases give their owners a 
monopoly on information, their bad effects (decrease in quantity and quality, 
and increase in price) should be avoided. For those databases, the current 
protection does not fully respect freedom of speech and the public’s right to 
information. To avoid that, the Directive should force the database maker to 
license her database to users in some cases to prevent refusals to grant access 
or excessive prices. The initial draft Directive included a compulsory licence 
provision for sole source databases only.50 Compulsory licensing in the case 
                                                 
47  Geiger, supra n. 19, at 360–62 (discussing the citation and news reporting exceptions in 
copyright law).  
48  See also E. Dommering, ‘An Introduction to Information Law, Works of Fact at the 
Crossroads of Freedom and Protection’, in E.J. Dommering and P.B. Hugenhotlz, eds, 
Protecting Works of Fact, Copyright Freedom of Expression and Information Law 
(Deventer/Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991), 39 (suggests that to enable 
the free flow of information, databases of monopolists (for example, stock exchange 
quotations, telephone directories, television listings) must be subject to a compulsory 
licence); Geiger, supra n. 19, at 321–2, n. 372 (proposes compulsory licences for databases 
but does not make the distinction between sole source and multiple source databases). The 
difference between compulsory and statutory licences is explained below. 
49  For reasons, see F. Levêque and Y. Ménière, The Economics of Patent and Copyright 
(Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642622, 87. 
50  Article 8(1), COM (92) 24 final (‘Notwithstanding the right in Article 2(5) to prevent the 
unauthorised extraction and re-utilisation of the contents of a database, if the works or 
materials contained in a database which is made publicly available cannot be independently 
created, collected or obtained from any other source, the right to extract and reutilise, in 
whole or substantial parts, works or materials from that database for commercial purposes, 
shall be licensed on fair and non-discriminatory terms.’). The Commission dropped the 
provision because it encountered the opposition of local and national administrations. P. 
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of multiple source databases is unnecessary: since there is competition, 
access will be granted at reasonable prices and refusals to grant access will 
be rare.51  
Two monopolistic situations must be distinguished for the purpose of 
providing these compulsory or statutory licences. The first is when there is a 
single monopolist, the second when there are several monopolists of 
complementary goods (tragedy of the anticommons52). In this second case, it 
may be required that all monopolists grant access to the database at a 
reasonable price to anyone so that anyone can make a comprehensive 
database (containing theirs). This remedy is adequate ex post. Ex ante, it is 
only adequate if the new database is not a complete substitute to theirs 
because in this case, their incentive to make the initial databases will be 
reduced. This will depend on each case. For instance, in the case of a 
proposed national telephone directory, users may want to access only a 
regional one, so the exhaustive national telephone directory will not 
substitute the regional one for users who are not interested in finding 
telephone numbers of persons located in other regions. Similarly, a criminal 
lawyer may not want to have access to the whole of Westlaw because she 
never practices, for example, family or administrative law. It may be argued 
that any user may want to have access to a comprehensive database at some 
stage. Therefore the new comprehensive database that improves by definition 
on the previous ones will always be a substitute. Thus the compulsory or 
statutory licence remedy must be used with care. Perhaps a solution would be 
to apply this remedy only after a few years have lapsed (for example, three 
                                                                                                         
Gaudrat, ‘Loi de transposition de la directive 96/9 du 11 mars 1996 sur les bases de 
données: dispositions relatives au droit d’auteur’, RTD com. 51/3 (1998) 599. 
51  Every database producer will want to recoup its investment by charging a price for access 
rather than letting its competitors do so. If she refuses to grant access, a competitor may or 
will do so and she will lose an opportunity to recoup her investment by licensing the use to 
the user. 
52  This economic concept means that a resource is prone to under-use when multiple owners 
each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no-one has an effective 
privilege of use. This happens when two producers have a monopoly on two 
complementary goods. A basic example is the following: producer A makes left shoes and 
producer B makes right shoes. In this case, independent pricing leads to sub-optimal usage. 
If producer A decreases the price of her good, then the demand for product B increases, but 
this benefit is not appropriated by producer A. Hence, both producers have insufficient 
incentives to lower prices. The final price of the goods (sum of the two prices) is larger than 
the price that a single owner would set. In other words, A and B price their goods at two 
prices, which taken together is higher than if there was only one monopoly (that is, only 
one producer would produce the two complementary goods). This means that one 
monopoly is better than two. Under this tragedy of the anticommons, a merger of the two 
producers is better than having them producing the goods separately. On this tragedy, see, 
for example, Levêque and Ménière, supra n. 49, 17 ff; M. Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’, Harvard Law Review 111 
(1998), 621.  
 
 Database Sui Generis Right 17 
 
 
years). The same solution should apply a fortiori in the first case (single 
monopolist), because in that case, there is direct competition, that is, the new 
database automatically will replace the initial one. So in both cases, a 
compulsory or statutory licence should only apply when the proposed new 
database is better than the initial database and after a few years so that most 
of the investment made by the first compiler can be recouped in the most 
profitable way. 
What is the difference between a compulsory and a statutory licence? 
Under a compulsory licence, whereas the user has no right to make use of the 
work without the prior authorisation of the right owner, the latter is obliged 
to contract with users who request a licence and the price is determined 
through negotiations (if they are not fruitful, the courts or an administrative 
authority steps in).53 Under a statutory licence, the user is free to use the 
work without authorisation provided she pays a price (generally 
predetermined by law).54 The choice between a compulsory licence and a 
statutory licence should be guided by the importance of the data to society. 
This is examined below.  
Which databases create monopolies and should be subject to a compulsory 
or statutory licence? Four situations can be identified. The first can occur 
with some databases of collected information. Normally, where the 
information is collected, it is copied by the database producer and it remains 
in the public domain. However the sui generis right can lead to monopoly 
when the information collected is by definition removed from the public 
domain. An example is the situation of museums or galleries, which hold 
unique pieces. The monopoly arises because, once collected, those works do 
not ‘leave an exemplary in the public domain’. A distinction should be made 
between museums or galleries constituted of works fallen into the public 
domain and those constituted of works still in copyright. In the case of 
databases consisting of works in unique exemplary already fallen into the 
public domain, the Directive should provide for a statutory licence. Under 
this licence, visitors should, for example, be able to take pictures or film the 
works without permission. A price may have to be paid but extraction and re-
utilisation should not be refused (for example, unless it would damage 
artwork). This licence should exist when the museum itself does not sell 
reproductions of the works at a reasonable price.  
The second situation occurs with databases constituted of protected 
                                                 
53  J. Ginsburg, ‘Creation and commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of 
Information in the United States’, in E.J. Dommering and P.B. Hugenholtz, eds, Protecting 
Works of Fact, Copyright Freedom of Expression and Information Law (Deventer/Boston: 
Kluwer law and taxation publishers, 1991), 54–5. 
54  L. Guibault, Copyright Limitations and Contracts: An Analysis of the Contractual 
Overridability of Limitations on Copyright (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 
25.  
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subject-matter assigned to the database producer. The case of a gallery or 
museum composed of protected works falls into this situation. If a protected 
work is assigned to a database maker, it belongs in exclusivity to the 
database maker and it might be an infringement of the sui generis right to 
extract whole or part of this work. Normally the reproduction in full of a 
copyrighted work is also a copyright infringement so the fact that the work is 
included in a database does not change the matter. However the database 
right should not prevent a user from exercising the exceptions on the 
copyright work because it is included in the database. Thus, if copyright law 
allows the reproduction or communication of the whole or a substantial part 
of a work under one of its exceptions, the fact that the work is included in a 
database should not prevent the application of the copyright exceptions that 
are applicable to it. In other words, the database right should not be a means 
to circumvent the copyright exceptions. Article 7(4) could be redrafted more 
precisely to address this specific problem.  
Third, a monopoly can also arise when there is a substantial investment in 
presenting created information. Two situations should be distinguished. First, 
if the created data can be presented in many different useful ways, since 
many types of useful presentations are possible, competition is possible as 
created data is not protectable. This situation is therefore not problematic and 
the sui generis right should be able to accrue to those making the substantial 
investment in presenting the created data in various ways. The second 
situation is when the presentation is the only one that is user-friendly, useful. 
Another presentation will not be commercially viable. The sui generis right, 
if granted, would protect the arrangement (otherwise unprotected by 
copyright because not original) and since it cannot be rearranged in another 
useful way, the underlying data as well. Thus since it is not commercially 
viable to rearrange the data in another way, there is a monopoly on the 
presentation and the underlying data. Since there has been a substantial 
investment, it would be unfair to allow the public to get the presented data 
for free. The public has an interest in having the data presented to it in the 
most user-friendly way and such efforts should be rewarded. If they were 
not, the data would not be presented at all and the public would therefore not 
be able to benefit from it. However since such data is not available 
elsewhere, the risk of abusing the monopoly automatically granted by the 
law is high. Thus the Directive should provide for a statutory or compulsory 
licence in order to avoid prohibitive prices and refusals to licence. The public 
should pay for the information (in other words, the database maker should be 
rewarded for its presentation efforts) but only a fair and reasonable price.  
Fourth, a similar solution must exist for recorded data if it could only be 
recorded by one database maker because of prohibitive costs (for example, 
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meteorological, genomic data).55 In this case, the same abuses (refusals to 
grant access or excessive prices) are highly possible. When one is confronted 
with the presentation of naturally occurring elements that require 
considerable sums, not easily available, and the data is vital to society, the 
undertaking making the investment should on the one hand be rewarded for 
its endeavours through protection but, on the other, should not prevent 
mankind from benefiting from it. The Directive should therefore provide for 
a compulsory or statutory licence.  
Which type of licence is best suited for each type of situation? In the case 
of created data, a statutory licence seems more appropriate because the 
database owners are absolute monopolists. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that the information is not so vital to society that such a radical 
solution should not be advocated and that the less drastic solution of a 
compulsory licence should be preferred. In the case of recorded data, a 
compulsory licence seems more appropriate than a statutory licence because 
the risk of monopoly is less high (natural monopolists rather than absolute 
monopolists). On the other hand, it could be argued that since the 
information is so vital to society a statutory licence should be preferred. In 
the case of museums and galleries holding unique copies/items of public 
domain works, a statutory licence seems preferable due to the importance of 
the works to society. In all cases, it is an important and difficult choice best 
left to the legislature. There is also the question of the time when the licences 
should apply. This could fluctuate in respect of the investment made. If the 
investment is very important, the licence could only be applicable after a 
certain period of time (for example, a few years). If the investment is not 
important, the licence could be immediately applicable.  
To respect the public’s right to information, exceptions and licences 
should be subject to a final requirement. When a sole source database is 
involved, existing and proposed new exceptions based on the public’s right 
to information and proposed compulsory and statutory licences should be 
made imperative. As, in this case, database makers are monopolists, they can 
be tempted to use contracts and/or TPMs to restrict access to information. 
Since there are no other sources of the information, such restrictions are 
against the public’s right to information. Article 15 of the Directive attempts 
to remedy this problem but it only renders Article 8 imperative, not all 
exceptions. Also Article 15 applies indiscriminately to all databases whereas 
it should only apply to sole source databases. Article 15 should therefore be 
revised to render all exceptions justified by the public’s right to information 
imperative in case of sole source databases. This will solve the problem for 
                                                 
55  Recorded data is available to anyone to record as it is found in nature. However, in many 
cases, expensive tools or enormous resources must be used so that in effect it creates a 
natural monopoly since few entities have the resources to record the information. 
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contracts and TPMs. 
Article 6(4)(1) of the Copyright Directive,56 which also applies to the 
database right,57 attempts to remedy this problem as far as TPMs are 
concerned. However, it is not satisfactory. Commentators are anonymous [is 
this the right word?] to say it is obscure.58 There are two main problems with 
Article 6(4). First, under Article 6(4), the state can only intervene to allow 
users to benefit from exceptions on works whose access is blocked by TPMs 
if the rights owners do not do so within a reasonable amount of time. But the 
text does not state how long the rights owners have. Thus if they do not do 
anything, the state cannot intervene. Rights owners have no interest in 
intervening to reduce their rights. However, Article 6(4) can in fact give an 
incentive to rights owners to provide for access themselves rather than have 
such solution imposed by the state. Also it is rare that rights owners and 
users get to an agreement without being forced.59  
The second problem of Article 6(4) is that the rights owners or the state 
are obliged to intervene to guarantee the benefit of only some exceptions. For 
example, the private copying and citation exceptions are not in the list of 
Article 6(4) so the state is not obliged to guarantee its exercise to users. This 
means that rights owners can use TPMs to neutralise exceptions that are not 
in the list of Article 6(4). Such a possibility is unlawful: it violates human 
rights because such exceptions are founded on human rights. As human 
rights are hierarchically superior to the Directive, it could be said that Article 
6(4) is in this respect invalid.60 Thus Article 6(4) should be revised to include 
those exceptions. In the meantime, users could invoke Article 10 of the 
ECHR before courts to benefit from these exceptions if neither the rights 
owners nor the state allows them to benefit from them because they have not 
provided mechanisms to circumvent the TPMs in these cases. 
 
4.2    Solutions to Remedy the Potential Perpetual Term  
 
It is contrary to the economics of intellectual property not to allow a new 
term of protection if there is a new substantial investment. Such a new term 
                                                 
56  Article 6(4)(1) provides that ‘Notwithstanding the legal protection provided for in 
paragraph 1, in the absence of voluntary measures taken by rightholders, including 
agreements between rightholders and other parties concerned, Member States shall take 
appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make available to the beneficiary of an 
exception or limitation provided for in national law in accordance with Article 5(2)(a), 
(2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (3)(a), (3)(b) or (3)(e) the means of benefiting from that exception or 
limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation and where 
that beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or subject-matter concerned.’ 
57  See Article 6(4)(5) of the Copyright Directive. 
58  Geiger, supra n. 19, at 378. 
59  Ibid., at 378–79. 
60  Ibid., at 381. 
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can be given while concomitantly avoiding perpetual protection of old 
elements. It is possible that the ECJ ruling implies that the entirety of a 
dynamic database and a fortiori substantial parts of it are not protected 
perpetually. This is because once the term of 15 years has passed, there is no 
more substantial investment and thus there is no infringement in extracting or 
re-utilising the database or a substantial part of it. But this will only be 
possible if the user knows what the old and new elements in a dynamic 
database are. This knowledge is impossible to acquire under the current state 
of the law so the Directive must be revised to enable users to make the 
difference between old and new data.  
Two solutions can be identified in order to enable users to determine the 
date at which an element falls into the public domain.  
One solution is to tag the data with the date of either completion or 
publication of the database. If all elements are so tagged, the user will 
automatically know which ones are in the public domain and which ones are 
still protected. If the database maker makes a new substantial investment in 
re-verifying or re-presenting the whole database, she will have to re-tag the 
elements with the new date of completion or publication and all elements 
will still be protected under the new term. However if only part of a database 
is re-verified or re-arranged and this constitutes a substantial investment 
through a substantial change, the elements could be tagged distinguishing 
between the re-verified/re-arranged data (still protected) and the non-re-
verified/non-re-arranged data (not protected anymore). In this system for 
example, if the database maker only updates, verifies or re-arranges 10 per 
cent of the database, she gets renewed protection only for those 10 per cent 
and not for the entire database. The tagging solution respects the intellectual 
property rationale of limited duration (protecting the old elements does not 
give any incentive to the database maker), the principle that one should not 
be protected twice for the same effort, and the public’s right to information. 
The system is the same as the regime of derivative works in copyright law. A 
derivative work, which builds upon a work that is in the public domain, will 
only be protected in its new features. All that is in the public domain will 
remain free for all to use. It is not revived because someone makes a 
derivative work out of it.  
The second solution is to force database makers to deposit their initial 
database in a central register at the date of completion or publication of their 
database. Once the term of 15 years expires, anyone could access the 
database through the register. Meanwhile, the database producer could still 
update its database and market it. Each time she updates it, she would have to 
deposit the new database to the register. This register could be on-line and 
users could access ‘old’/public domain databases there.  
Which solution is best? Providing access to ‘old’ databases by tagging is 
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easy for off-line databases, which include both CD-ROM and paper 
databases. As the database maker of an off-line database can issue versions 
every so often (for example, six months, a year), each version will be 
protected for 15 years and the data will be tagged with the date of completion 
or making available in each version. The old version will thus be in the 
public domain after 15 years. Even if the new version comprises the same 
data, the old version may still be available, perhaps not on the market but in 
libraries, in second-hand shops, or simply because the user had acquired it 
earlier. Thus the situation is clear and simple for the user. She knows she 
does not infringe because all the data is visible and tagged.  
By contrast, with a constantly updated on-line database (a dynamic 
database), tagging is not an adequate solution. The old data is merged with 
the new data and is not directly visible to the user. The user will make a 
search and will get a number of hits, which will reveal the status of the data 
(old or new). However, she will have paid a fee for accessing the whole 
database comprising the old and new elements and will pay for extraction or 
re-utilisation of any element, old or new before knowing whether what she 
will extract is old or new. So she may end up paying for extraction and/or re-
utilisation of old elements. Thus the old data will never be accessible for 
free61 unless the database owner is required by law to make available, after a 
regular period of time (for example, six months, a year), a printed version of 
its database or alternatively provides for free the ‘old’ elements on-line (for 
example, by marketing two products, one free with only the old elements the 
other for subscription containing only the new elements). Thus with dynamic 
databases, there is a danger of locking up public domain information since 
old versions will not be available but only the constantly updated and thus 
perpetually protected database. The solution would be to force the database 
maker to make available the old database for free after a period of time. The 
idea of the register seems thus preferable. In fact a combination of tagging 
and registration is ideal. 
How should this work in practice? All the elements of the first version of 
a dynamic database should be tagged. The database should then be 
registered. Thereafter, the database producer should continue tagging each 
additional item and register her database each time a new element is added. 
As these databases will be in electronic format, this is not taxing. The 
registrar would then release the old data in the public domain62 at the expiry 
                                                 
61  L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004, 2nd edn), 300, n. 72 (‘Accessing such database may be unproblematic where there is 
a hard copy, but much more difficult where the owner of database right has only distributed 
the database ‘online’ and has subjected it to regular updating.’).  
62  J. Lipton, ‘Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in 
Databases’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 18 (2003), 778, 841. 
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of the 15 years (that is, make it available on the Internet or otherwise if not 
possible63). It will be easy to do so as each item will be tagged. The release 
of the database in the public domain by the registrar is more certain than if 
left to the sole good will of database owners of dynamic databases. A small 
filing fee could be requested for the purpose of recouping the costs of 
maintaining the register. Thus the register would serve to establish the term 
of protection but also would preserve the public domain. As can be seen, a 
combination of tagging and registration is adequate for dynamic databases. 
In conclusion, the Directive should be revised to provide clearly that old 
elements of a database are unprotected after the expiration of the initial 15 
years term unless they have been re-verified or re-arranged. In addition, the 
Directive should provide that database owners must tag each element of their 
databases and register their databases in a central registry. The Directive 
should also provide that the registrar, at the end of the 15 years’ term, should 
release the old data in the public domain, ideally on the Internet. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has shown that it is necessary to take the public’s right to 
information into consideration when applying the database right. This is 
because both these rights are human rights and are on the same level. Ideally, 
the public’s right to information should be taken into account within the 
database right itself, which, as has been shown, has not been the case in all of 
its aspects. When it is not and until the Directive is revised, Article 10 of the 
ECHR can be invoked before jurisdictions to correct the imbalance. This has 
already been attempted in the framework of copyright law (to construe the 
citation exception flexibly), unsuccessfully in France,64 but successfully in 
Germany.65 
Thus while we are waiting for the Directive to be revised,66 courts could 
use article 10 of the ECHR to construe the existing exceptions broadly and 
even add to them (for example, citation and news reporting exceptions) as 
                                                 
63  As suggested by J. Wolken, ‘Just the Facts, Ma’am. A Case for Uniform Federal 
Regulation of Information Databases in the New Information Age’, Syracuse Law Review 
48 (1998) 1296. 
64  See the Fabris v France 2 decisions (Paris Court of First Instance, 23 February 1999, D. 
1999, Jur. 580; Paris Court of Appeal 30 May 2001, Légipresse 2001, 184, at 137 and 
Court of Cassation, 13 November 2003, Dalloz, 2004, Jur., 200). For a discussion, see 
Geiger, supra n. 19, 391 ff.  
65  For a discussion, see Geiger, supra n. 19, 402 ff.  
66  A report has been handed down by the Commission on 12 December 2005 recommending 
certain options (for example, revising or abolishing the sui generis right) and requesting 
comments before taking action. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/ 
docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf. 
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well as force database producers to make the old elements accessible to 
users, for example, on the Internet. They could also allow users of sole 
source database producers, on the basis of article 10 of the ECHR or of 
competition law, to circumvent TPMs in the cases provided for in Article 
6(4) of the Copyright Directive as well as in the cases of other exceptions not 
provided there but justified by the public’s right to information. Finally, still 
on the basis of Article 10 of the ECHR, courts could allow users to breach 
their contracts with sole source database producers that override exceptions 
based on the public’s right to information.  
 
